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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Ronald Lee Macik appeals from the district court's order summarily
dismissing his untimely petition for post-conviction relief, filed nearly 40 years
after he pied guilty to first-degree murder.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
On August 31, 1972, Macik pied guilty to first-degree murder, and, on
September 14, 1972, the court imposed a life sentence.

(R., p.29.)

"Macik

evidently did not appeal, or any appeal that he filed was dismissed, [as there is]
no record of an appeal in his case other than the appeal of his co-defendant,
Danny Powers." State v. Macik, Docket No. 39233, 2012 Unpublished Opinion
No. 491 (Idaho App. May 24, 2012). 1
"On March 14, 2011, Macik wrote a letter to the district court which was
treated as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and counsel was appointed to
represent him." Macik at p.1.

'The district court denied Macik's motion upon

concluding that the court was without jurisdiction to consider the merits of his
claim."

JsL

The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating: "It is apparent that the district

court did not possess jurisdiction to grant Macik's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea more than thirty-eight years after judgment was entered.

1

Therefore, the

The district court took judicial notice of "the underlying record, in Case No. CRFE-1971-000949 (formerly Case No. Cr. 4949)" and the Court of Appeals'
opinion "remitted" on June 28, 2012. (R., p.21.) A copy of the Court of Appeals'
2012 opinion in Macik is attached hereto as Appendix A.
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district court's order denying Macik's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is
affirmed."

kl at p.2.

On July 26, 2012, two months after the Court of Appeals affirmed the
denial of Macik's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Macik filed a pro se petition
for post-conviction relief alleging (1) a court-ordered mental evaluation report was
withheld from the defense; (2) a "violation of [his] Miranda rights"; and (3) his
guilty plea was coerced.

(R., pp.3-4.)

Macik also alleged counsel was not

present at his change of plea hearing, he did not receive "a record of any
proceeding in CR-4949 until May 27, 2009," "another inmate confessed to
committing the murder" and he "did not have a clear or sound mind." (R., p.5.)
Macik also filed a motion for the appointment of counsel, which the district court
denied upon concluding "Macik's post-conviction claims are untimely."

(R.,

pp.10-13, 23.) More specifically, the court noted Macik "fail[ed] to allege anything
that raises the possibility of valid claims" since all of Macik's claims relate to his
"entry of plea on August 31, 1972, or potential suppression issues" and "do not
relate to his Motion to Withdraw Plea filed March 17, 2011, thirty-eight and onehalf (38½) years after pleading guilty, which th[e] Court denied on September 8,
2011." (R., pp.23-24 (emphasis original).)
On August 22, 2012, the state filed a motion for summary dismissal,
asserting that "although [Macik] did file a substantive motion in 2011, the matters
in the Uniform Post-Conviction petition address proceedings that occurred in
1971-1972.

Accordingly, the petition is well outside the one-year time limit
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established in I.C. 19-4902." (R., pp.26-27.) The district court entered an order
dismissing Macik's petition on August 27, 2012. (R., pp.29-32.)
Two days later, Macik filed a "Motion for Leave to Amend," arguing
(verbatim):
The Petitioner was granted permission to file a direct appeal
on His conviction by the Idaho Court's of Appeals, and that direct
appeal was denied. Petition now seeks to file an original PostConviction Petition as provided by law, upon his conviction based
on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and other
matters, which will be more defined in an amended petition.
Petitioner originally predicated that counsel would be appointed and
his counsel would amend the petition according to prerequisites of
the Court. However, counsel has been denied and Petition must
now conform his Petition without the benefit of counsel, and prays
this Honorable Court will permit Petitioner the right pursuant to the
Act, to amend His petition before dismissal so that proper evidence
and allegations can be submitted for the courts review, as counsel
is not available to do so.
The Petitioner requests permIssIon to file documents,
affidavit's, transcripts, and other material evidence in support of His
claims. He is unschooled in the law, has limited resources and it
would be a manifest injustice to determine the merits of his claims
without giving Him the opportunity to amend pursuant to statutory
mandate.
(R., pp.33-34.)
The court denied Macik's motion because Macik failed to "present any
good cause as to why any new claims exist that could not have been included in
the Petition" and because Macik failed to "identify what, if any, new claims he
might have."

(R., p.36.)

The court also reiterated that Macik's "underlying

criminal case is nearly forty (40) years old." (Id.)
The court entered judgment on August 30, 2012, from which Macik filed a
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.38-43.)

3

ISSUE
Macik states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Macik's postconviction petition without providing him twenty days to respond to
the State's motion to dismiss?
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Macik failed to show reversible error in the summary dismissal of his
untimely post-conviction petition?

4

ARGUMENT
Macik Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In The Summary Dismissal Of
His Untimely Post-Conviction Petition

A.

Introduction
Macik asserts the district court erred when it dismissed his petition

because the court did not give him 20 days to respond to the state's motion for
summary dismissal.

(Appellant's Brief, p.3.)

Although Macik is correct in his

assertion that the district court dismissed his petition without giving him 20 days
to respond to the state's motion for summary dismissal, the Court should find the
error harmless in this case.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

C.

Macik Has Failed To Show Reversible Error In The Summary Dismissal Of
His Untimely Petition
"Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) permits either party in a post-conviction relief

proceeding to file a motion for summary disposition of the application." DeRushe
v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 601, 200 P.3d 1148, 1150 (2009). Although the district
court is not required to provide a 20-day notice prior to granting a state's motion
for summary dismissal, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a "like twenty day
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period of time shall be allowed" to respond to the state's motion.

State v.

Christensen, 102 Idaho 487,489,632 P.2d 676,678 (1981); also Saykhamchone
v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995) ("After the state files a
subsection (c) motion, a petitioner is still entitled to twenty days to respond, so as
to afford an opportunity to establish a material fact issue."). Although the district
court dismissed Macik's petition before the 20-day period expired, the Court
should find the error harmless in this case.
Post-conviction relief proceedings are governed by the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure. DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 601, 200 P.3d at 1150 (citing Stuart v.
State, 127 Idaho 806, 813, 907 P.2d 783, 790 (1995); I.C. § 19-4907(a)). Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 61 states, in relevant part: "The court at every stage of
the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
"Prior to 1979, applications for post-conviction relief could be filed at any
time." LaFon v. State, 119 Idaho 387, 388, 807 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1991 ). In
1979, the legislature amended I.C. § 19-4902 to impose a five-year statute of
limitation, and the Court of Appeals "ruled that the five-year statute of limitation
applies to applications for relief from convictions entered before 1979."

.lit

"In

such cases, the five-year limitation period began to run on July 1, 1979, the
effective date of the amendment." 2

.lit at 389,

807 P.2d at 68 (citation omitted).

Thus, Macik had until July 1, 1984, to file his post-conviction petition. Macik did
not, however, file his petition until 28 years later. (R., p.3.)

2

Idaho Code Section 19-4902 has since been amended and now provides for a
one-year limitation period.
6

The failure to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for
dismissal of the petition. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190-191, 30 P.3d
967, 968-969 (2001 ).

However, "[i]n Idaho, equitable tolling of the statute of

limitation for filing a post-conviction petition has been recognized" in two
circumstances:

(1) "where the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state

facility on an in-state conviction without legal representation or access to Idaho
legal materials;" and (2) "where mental disease and/or psychotropic medication
renders a petitioner incompetent and prevents petitioner from earlier pursuing
challenges to his conviction." Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188, 190, 219 P.3d
1204, 1206 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted).
Nowhere in his petition or supporting affidavit does Macik explain why his
petition was not filed until decades after he pied guilty. (See generally R., pp.39.) Nor did Macik provide any explanation in his Motion for Leave to Amend.
(See generally R., pp.33-34.)

Macik correctly notes that, in his petition and

affidavit, he asserted he was on Thorazine. (Appellant's Brief, p.4; R., pp.4, 8.)
Macik, however, also acknowledges "those facts alone would not necessarily
establish a justification for equitable tolling," but claims, "if provided the
opportunity, [he] could have established that his mental incapacity persisted to
the date he filed his post-conviction petition." (Appellant's Brief, p.4.) Contrary to
Macik's suggestion on appeal, he was not deprived of that opportunity.
While Macik was not required to allege in his petition the reasons he failed
to comply with the statute of limitation and why he should be entitled to tolling,
the court's order denying his request for counsel put him on notice that his
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petition failed to state the possibility of a valid claim because all of the claims
were untimely. Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 792, 992 P.2d 783, 787 (Ct.
App. 1999) ("Although it would be prudent for an applicant to allege facts which
he contends would avoid the time bar when an application is filed outside the
one-year period specified in § 19-4902, the absence of such allegations in the
initial pleading is not fatal to an applicant's claims.") Macik subsequently filed his
Motion for Leave to Amend, acknowledging that the court denied his request for
counsel and requesting leave amend his petition to provide "proper evidence and
allegations" including affidavits, transcripts, "and other material evidence in
support of His [sic] claims."

(R., p.34 (emphasis added).)

Despite the

opportunity to address the court's finding that his petition was untimely, Macik
said nothing about how he could overcome this procedural hurdle.

Instead,

Macik essentially asked the court to provide him additional time to provide
evidence to support his claims.
Further, it should be noted that Macik's references to Thorazine were not
made in the context of any request for tolling, nor did he allege that he has been
on Thorazine for the past 40 years. (See generally R., pp.4, 8.) What Macik
alleged was that he was placed on Thorazine on October 1, 1969, when he was
"committed to" prison and was "required to take [it] three times daily before
during and after [his] trial essentially causing [him] to be a mere spetator [sic] at
[his] own trial incapable of any rational thought [and] abandoned by [his]
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assigned attorney and forced to plead." (R., p.8 (punctuation original).) 3 Macik's
assertion that he "could have established that his mental incapacity persisted to
the date he filed his post-conviction petition" if he had been "provided the
opportunity" is not only speculative, it is inconsistent with the record as Macik's
petition and affidavit do not suggest that he was prevented from filing a petition
due to Thorazine and he was able to file a responsive pleading with the court, but
failed to address the critical defect in his petition. Cf. Anderson, 133 Idaho at
793, 992 P.2d at 788 ("In this case, Anderson did not respond to the State's
motion with an affidavit or other documentary evidence of facts that would toll the
statute of limitations.").
Because Macik did not file his post-conviction petition until nearly 40 years
after he pied guilty and 28 years after the statute of limitation expired, and given
that he had an opportunity, before judgment was entered, to provide the district
court with evidence that he should be entitled to tolling for the enormous delay
beyond the five-year statute of limitation, the Court should find the failure to
afford Macik 20 days in which to respond to the state's motion harmless.

3

Although Macik does not assert it as a potential basis for tolling, Macik also
alleged in his petition that he was transferred to a "Federal Prison at Lewisburg
PA" on "Dec 1s1 1972." (R., p.8.) As with Macik's Thorazine-based incompetence
argument, Macik made no connection between his transfer and his ability to file a
post-conviction petition. Indeed, Macik acknowledges in his affidavit that he was
able to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in 2011 at which time he was
represented by the Ada County Public Defender. (R., p.8.)
9

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing Macik's petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 11 th day of June 2013.

ty Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11 th day of June 2013, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SHAWN F. WILKERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

Attorney General
JML/pm
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APPENDIX A

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 39233
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RONALD L. MACIK,
Defendant-Appellant.

________________

2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 491
Filed: May 24, 2012
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
OPINION AND SHALL NOT
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge.
Order denying motion to withdraw guilty plea, affirmed.
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Elizabeth A. Allred, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
LANSING, Judge
Ronald L. Macik appeals from the district court's denial of Macik's motion for
withdrawal of his guilty plea, which was filed more than thirty-eight years after entry of his
judgment of conviction.
On September 14, 1972, Macik was convicted of first degree murder on his plea of guilty.
He was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. Macik evidently did not appeal, or any appeal
that he filed was dismissed, for we find no record of an appeal in his case other than the appeal
of his co-defendant, Danny Powers. On March 14, 2011, Macik wrote a letter to the district
court which was treated as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and counsel was appointed to
represent him. The district court denied Macik's motion upon concluding that the court was
without jurisdiction to consider the merits of his claim.
Although "[m]indful of State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352,355, [79 P.3d 711, 714] (2003),"
in which the Idaho Supreme Court held that a trial court is without jurisdiction to entertain a

1

motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea after the judgment in the criminal case has become final,
Macik nevertheless appeals. In Jakoski, the Supreme Court stated, "Absent a statute or rule
extending its jurisdiction, the trial court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires
once the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the
judgment on appeal." Id. at 355, 79 P.3d at 714. Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c), which authorizes
motions to withdraw guilty pleas, "does not include any provision extending the jurisdiction of
the trial court for the purpose of hearing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea." Id. Consequently,
a trial court possesses no jurisdiction to consider a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea after
the judgment of conviction has become final.

This absence of jurisdiction precludes

consideration of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "irrespective of the merits" of the
defendant's claim. State v. Wegner, 148 Idaho 270,272,220 P.3d 1089, 1091 (2009).

It is apparent that the district court did not possess jurisdiction to grant Macik' s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea more than thirty-eight years after judgment was entered. Therefore, the
district court's order denying Macik's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge GUTIERREZ CONCUR.
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